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Abstract. After the classical heritage of both Civil Law and Common Law is characterised, their juristische 
Weltanschauung as professional deontology is reconstructed in parallel with their respective assumptions in theory 
formation. As to the nature of legal process, the moment of concealment is identiﬁ ed in both types with the ﬁ nal 
conclusion reached that humans’ individual activity and personal responsibility is hidden in the machinery. Civil 
Law is deﬁ ned by rules enacted as the sole embodiment of the law, treated conceptually in a linguistico-logical 
way so as to be suitable to lead to mechanical application within the range of a meta-level dogmatic system. The 
interplay between logical subsumption and volitional classiﬁ catory subordination is analysed in order to show 
what legal ascriptivity is and why it ends with the artiﬁ cial construction of legal force. Accordingly, Civil Law 
ideology is imbued with analogies as if cognition were at stake, in contrast to Common Law openly undertaking 
ﬁ ction to explain in what manner the judicial deliberation on facts whilst reconstruing the whys and hows of past 
instances can result in ascertaining what the law has allegedly ever been. The law’s understanding–theorised in the 
former and pragmatised in the latter case–is part of its applying as an ontic component of the very existence of the 
complex social phenomenon called law.
Keywords: concept of law, law-applying, juristische Weltanschauung as professional deontology, disanthropo-
morphisation, legal ideologies theorised/pragmatised, Civil Law, Common Law, comparative judicial mind
I. Classical Heritage
1. The rich legal heritage of the Romans, with its changing internal emphases, assured a 
basis for the development of two differing traditions during the European Middle Ages and 
Modern Times. In the course of this formative process, starting in the 16th and 17th centuries 
the approaches to law characteristic of our Continent and of the Anglo-Saxon archipelago 
were gradually separated as they were strengthened by the failure of attempts to codify the 
law in England.1
1. Continental Law
2. As soon as this separation has been perfected, in continental law nothing remains from 
the ius except that which has been posited as a lex. In terms of this transformation process, 
the regola–once serving as a didactic exercise and summation–becomes the sole bearer of 
any legal quality as a set of linguistic signs that is destined to embody the law.
From that time on, anyone who is eager to know what the law is (in terms of its sense, 
message or signiﬁ cance) must turn to its embodiment in and by rules.
3. By this act and starting from the Roman imperial epoch, such a form becomes the 
exclusive source of any contents hidden in and by it. Of course, this form may easily prove 
to be casual, random and/or fallible; nevertheless, nothing else can be taken as law other 
than precisely that which has been edicted. This form is no longer an external gown veiling 
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the legislator’s idea but the sole embodiment. With such a solution principally strengthened 
(but still as a correction mechanism building around the original idea), it will be accepted 
only later that whatever interpretation of the law’s provisions may nevertheless draw from 
the law-maker’s intent–as an auxiliary source (that is, among other additional sources)–
anything that can be read from (a) the conditions understood by the legislator, (b) the whole 
texture of regulation, (c) the actual knowledge as to the historical circumstances of 
legislation or (d) the intentions expressed during the bureaucratic procedure of legislation.
4. Law is, therefore, a text with a meaning that can be ascertained through textual 
analysis, that is, by the help of linguistic and logical devices used to look for connections 
and their disclosure. As interpretation theories would also formulate it, in case of necessity 
the interpreter might also have recourse to a search for proper meaning through the law’s 
context as drawn from either (a) the intent of the legislator or (b) the historical conditions or 
(c) the systematic setting of the given piece of legislation.
5. The very fact that the law is embodied by enacted texts and, therefore, it is treated 
textually in practice makes it possible for jurisprudential interpretation to forge concepts 
out of mere words used in the legal texture, in the course of classiﬁ cations. It is no longer 
simple words but conceptualisations that stand for–as a representation of–diverse aspects of 
reality, conceptualisations that are developed into a complex and hierarchically organised 
notional system, which is deﬁ ned in its components’ mutual relations by boundaries with 
edged contours. These concepts are positioned as loci of a taxonomic systemicity, erected in 
place of mere words.
6. Such conceptuality is, however, not imbued directly by the law’s texture itself; the 
words used in the gesetztes Recht do not simply contain it. For legis latio is a practical act 
throughout. It is the volitional product of the agent authorised to issue normative texts. This 
is the mere result of some volitio: contingent in principle, plainly arbitrary in a philosophical 
sense, since, optionally, it could be something else as well.
7. What pulls law as such to the conceptual world is the jurisprudents’ conceptual 
analysis: classiﬁ cation and system-building, through which the jurisprudential reasoning 
over the internal connections of the law-stuff will create concepts by drawing analogies 
amongst individual words or by breaking down and/or splitting already established concepts 
into others. As an obvious denominational analogy–supported by the memory of the strict 
conceptuality disassembled from Biblical texts–this is what we call Rechtsdogmatik. Such a 
doctrine is the production of legal scholars having analysed law texts with the intent of 
forging an internal systemic connection in view of reaching this availably perfect conceptual 
systemic network from that resource of processing. Once established–and only provided 
that such a demand for conceptual systemic building is grounded on the common ethos of 
the given legal profession (not as an unnoticed pioneering attempt but expressing the 
mainstream of the age as, for instance, in Leibniz’ epoch)–, such a doctrinal net (with the 
actual shape it has acquired) will form a web of understanding around the law, i.e. a weakly 
(though informal) normative environment that already serves as a kind of pre-understanding 
[Vorverständnis] for all kinds of juristic activity when those professionals (making, applying 
or just studying law) start dealing with normative or other legal texts.
Accordingly, and as a point of principle, legal texts themselves have ever been and 
will remain incidental and fallible. Their human understanding in this very culture (with the 
law already taken at a conceptual meta-level) will become imbued with such a doctrinal 
knowledge, slowly to be entirely presupposed by it.
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(This is why in such cultures law, legal practice and their doctrinal representation may 
stand as relatively separate but mutually preconditioned and interactive entities, albeit in the 
social division of labour specialists are accustomed to cultivate one or the other as their 
speciﬁ c ﬁ elds.)
8. As soon as the legal text is seen as ordered by conceptual limitations and additional 
adjustments (e.g. by making exceptions through further internal splitting)–with any element 
or partial ﬁ eld treated as the product of the breakdown of the overall total regulation, 
considered (in given time segments) as a closed unit, logically coherent and settled in 
details–well, then whatever idea we can form about law will from the outset be marked by a 
systemic place or locus, the basic features and deﬁ nitions of which will already derive from 
its systemic deﬁ nition.
9. As a pattern of thought, thereby, the mos geometricus is given a shape. This is a 
concept deriving from the movement characteristic of the 16th century, when the European 
continental manner of studying law was set for centuries, that is, a methodological ideal 
that laid the constant foundation of our approach to law, prevalent even now. Beginning 
from classical times in Bologna, this idea permeated the reception of Roman law all over 
Latinic and Germanic Europe; despite all kinds of shaking, rectiﬁ cation, challenge and 
enrichment with new trends, this is the model that grants commonality in our respective 
understanding of law, while deﬁ ning our identity and membership in one deﬁ nite legal 
culture.
Within this intellectuality, the cultivation of law is seen in the composition of a series 
of operations similar to those in mathematics, upon the basis of which the ideal has ever 
been to build up a perfect system both closed and exclusive, which, if challenged, can only 
be replaced by another, completely new in principle, according to EUCLID’s axiomatism.
10. The ideal of law represented by such an idea of normative systemicity will at the 
same time produce its pair and completion reﬂ ected in the world of factual reality, referenced 
in and by the law. This is the Tatbestand–taken as the aggregate of those facts that constitute 
a case in law–, which can only be thought of within the frame of a doctrinally organised 
approach to law (as a representation of Sein in counterpart to Sollen, with the former 
featuring the marks qualiﬁ ed by the latter). The notion of Tatbestand is a product of the 
mid-19th century continental culture, of the idea that legal scholarship reduced to 
Begriffsjurisprudenz [conceptual jurisprudence]–while approaching law-related (law-
referenced) factual reality in a conceptual way–can be developed. It is not by chance that 
the term Tatbestand has no proper equivalent in English, where–without any polarisation 
between Rechtssetzung [law-making] and Rechtsanwendung [law-applying], administration 
of justice is practiced (instead of the law’s ‘application’)2–it can only be circumscribed (as 
translated from Max Weber, for instance) by “operative facts”, “actual circumstances” or 
“facts that constitute a case in law”.
11. Well, according to its theoretical model, law-application projects the world of 
norms onto that of facts, ascribing the former’s normative requirements to the latter. Or, 
what is modelled here is the set of reality aspects of those actual events, actions and 
situations that, matched separately one by one, will in their entirety add to deﬁ ne a particular 
Tatbestand, taken as a case of the rule, representing those reality aspects deﬁ ned through 
2 Cf. Sack, P. S.: Law and Custom: Reﬂ ections on the Relations between English Law and the 
English Language. Rechtstheorie, 18 (1987) 4, 421–436.
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the abstract formulations of a rule, to which the rule ascribes some legal conclusion (or 
sanction).
12. This model is based on logical inclusion. What is at stake here is a particular 
actualisation on the plane of individuality, of what the norm has deﬁ ned on the plane of 
generality. Starting from the norm, this will ground the logical necessity of judicial 
syllogism [subsumptio] that will lead to the judgment, based on the given norm, concluded 
from its generality. (For instance, providing the norm sanctions humans killing humans, and 
our case is about homicide, then the sanction imputed to anyone having performed the deed 
must be meted out.)3
2. Anglo-Saxon Law
13. The Anglo-Saxon mentality has adapted quite a differing pattern of legal regulation and 
judicial settlement of conﬂ icts from the same Roman legacy. It continued its patterner’s 
earlier attempts towards methodicalness, not departing too much further from the ancient 
Jewish and Islamic traditions.
It did not look for safety in either conceptualising generalisation or the systemicity it 
had achieved; it did not dedicate its exclusive trust to the force of central edicts, believed to 
be suitable to settle everything. It was satisﬁ ed to build up law through examples following 
other examples, progressing casually by concrete situations answered by justices, who drew 
their pattern from their comparisons with earlier patterns, with the ﬁ nal outcome being that 
the judges themselves, proceeding in individual cases, could became the agents to declare 
what the legal tradition (reﬂ ected in their case) had always been. In order to master the very 
process of such a continual actualisation of the law, discipline and rational safety had to be 
assured to the extent feasible. This way, the Anglo-Saxon law’s casual and inductive 
processing and its respect for the unique in the genuine representation of the fullness of life 
(and, thereby, also its openness towards any novelty in a given situation) could preserve a 
bit of sensitivity toward practical reason and daily moral deliberations, notwithstanding the 
fact that it could also successfully separate itself from the heterogeneity of everyday life 
through the artiﬁ cial reason it erected. On the one hand, in the case of adjudication it alleges 
it has based its judgment on unstated rules but, on the other, it refrains from declaring what 
regolas have indeed been serving it. In consequence, almost until today it has not cultivated 
the kind of doctrinal culture that may build on general abstract norms exclusively.
The Anglo-Saxon law cannot be taken as thoroughly conceptualised into an overall 
taxonomic system, independent of whether an enormous amount of rationalising literature 
has for centuries ediﬁ ed rather considerable meta-intellectuality above it. Instead of 
employing conceptual systemic consistency and completeness to build a replacement of the 
given chaotic accumulation, this literature responds mostly to practical challenges in terms 
of functionality and practicality.4
3 Cf., in ﬁ rst formulation, by Varga, Cs.: Moderne Staatlichkeit und modernes formales Rechts. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica, 26 (1984) 1–2, 235–241.
4 Cf., by Varga, Cs.: Differing Mentalities of Civil Law and Common Law? The Issue of Logic 
in Law. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 48 (2007) 4, 401–410 {and <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/
b0m8x67227572219/fulltext.pdf>, abridged as Rule and/or Norm, or the Conceptualisibility and 
Logiﬁ ability of Law. In: Schweighofer, E.–Liebwald, D.–Angeneder, S.–Menzel, T. (hrsg.): Efﬁ zienz 
von e-Lösungen in Staat und Gesellschaft. Aktuelle Fragen der Rechtsinformatik. Tagungsband der 8. 
Internationalen Rechtsinformatik Symposions, IRIS 2005. Stuttgart–München–Hannover–Berlin–
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II. Reality in our Approach to Law
14. The question arises whether or not our view formed on law in Civil Law cultures 
comports with institutional reality. The answer can only be ambivalent, that is, duplicate as 
formulated at different levels.
1. As Professional Deontology
15. Our previous characterisation is true in a descriptive sense in so far as it gives an 
account of the ideal pattern of our legal thought. For ideology as a kind of professional 
deontology, a manner of thinking speciﬁ c to the legal profession, and in this sense a 
juristische Weltanschauung, has been and continues to be undoubtedly present in the 
approach to law rooted in our continental culture. In the above sense as well, ideology is 
consciousness that exerts impacts onto practice; consequently, it is a decisive component of 
the social ontological description of humans in action. This is part of a culture that assigns 
frames, within the boundaries of which we appropriate the world intellectually. Within 
them, we form key categories for understanding the world, while we also sense and/or 
attribute deﬁ nite value-contexts of/to the same world. In its turn, juristische Weltanschauung 
is the foundation stone of legal cultures that shapes human abilities (skills and sensitivities) 
by which we may sense law at all and search for paths and spheres of action with reference 
to it. As a consequence, independent of its epistemological status (namely, of the issue of 
whether or not our speciﬁ c law does indeed function this way, under its conditions and 
fulﬁ lling its criteria), the lawyers’ professional deontology is part of the genuine ontology 
of legal arrangements. Accordingly, it is part of the operation we can describe starting from 
the accumulated experience of (a) human practice making use of law, (b) the overall societal 
praxis and (c) jurisprudentia as the total sum of legal praxis.5
2. In its Theoretical Explanation
16. At the same time, theoretical reconstruction raises reasonable questions as to what 
indeed the existence of law does consist of, what are the consequences of its being carried 
by a linguistic medium, what are the chances of humans as socially exclusive acting agents 
and, at last but not least, in what exactly does their responsibility lie? Therefore, the inquiry 
goes on further: are we perhaps ourselves passive observers (perhaps mere reference points) 
in a structure operating like clockwork (possibly without our personal presence as well), 
since the law works as thoroughly logiﬁ ed within its pure formalism in a quasi-automatic 
way, broken down into a homogenised network that is empowered to produce its output, 
and which can reproduce itself continually–on the basis of its own presuppositions as 
equipped with its own laws and consequences, built in by some next-to-mechanical safety? 
Weimar–Dresden, 2005, 58–65}, as well as Varga, Cs.: Law and its Doctrinal Study (On Legal 
Dogmatics). Acta Juridica Hungarica, 49 (2008) 3, 253–274 {and <http://akademiai.om.hu/content/
g352w44h21258427/fulltext.pdf>} and Varga, Cs.: Legal Traditions? In Search for Families and 
Cultures of Law. In: Moreso, J. J. (eds): Legal Theory / Teoría del derecho. Legal Positivism and 
Conceptual Analysis / Postivismo jurídico y análisis conceptual: Proceedings of the 22nd IVR World 
Congress Granada 2005, I. Stuttgart, 2007, 181–193 {and [as a national report presented at the World 
Congress of the Académie internationale de Droit comparé] in <http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/AIDC/
PDF%20ﬁ les/IA/IA%20-%20Hungary.pdf> and Acta Juridica Hungarica, 46 (2005) 3–4, 177–197 
and <http://www.akademiai.com/content/f4q29175h0174r11/fulltext.pdf>}.
5 Cf., by Varga, Cs.: The Place of Law in Lukács’ World Concept. Budapest, 1985, 193. 
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The answer can only be formulated in terms of the suitability of human practice for self-
reproduction through its own traditions as characterised by today’s social theories, on the 
one hand, and of the irrevocable human responsibility as cultivated by the known theologies 
of morals, on the other.
17. Well, the ideological stand implied by our juristische Weltanschauung approaches 
both language and law as if they were simple objects of the world’s reality; as if it was 
going to suggest exactly what metaphysically inspired logic wanted to inspire actual belief 
in (particularly in Germanic philosophies6)–namely, that relations (of logic and dialectic 
especially) are hidden in, or implied by, things and objects (their moves, coincidences or 
conﬁ gurations) themselves. Nonetheless, it is exclusively statements that we can make as to 
objects and as to whatever kind of virtuality, that is, practically as to anything that can be 
speciﬁ ed by human ingenuity in the course of our mental appropriation of any imaginable 
world (involving the Golden Fleece or a unicorn, or hypothesising such limiting units of 
reference as the absolute cold or the arithmetic zero point, or abstracting the philosophical 
conclusion of “Das Nicht nichtet”, as developed by Martin Heidegger7). If and insofar as 
we treat such statements within one single coherently comprehensive perspective, then once 
the truth/falsity of any of them, grounding our argumentation, is acknowledged, we may 
deduce true/false conclusions from them.
18. At the same time, law is thoroughly disantropomorphised, and it is we who have 
done this. By abstracting from our subject’s substance and genuine nature (dependent 
directly on human volition, practice, consideration or pure interest), we are used to investing 
our trust (which we have not undertaken, because it is not relegated to our rational common 
sense) in something else–notably, in some virtually reiﬁ ed entity or safety, projected from 
ourselves into a kind of substitute authority. Accordingly, we began to treat law as a reiﬁ ed 
construction alienated from ourselves, as if it could operate without us, like the Delphi 
oracle or a God-judgment set in motion as a speciﬁ c slot-machine to settle our case, into 
which (as we are made to believe under the constraints of our professional socialisation) we 
might feed the parameters of the given case so that it would then dispense from its “black 
box” the single conclusive decision.
19. As to the device of our communication, we have to be aware of the fact that law 
as linguistic practice also can only be intelligible for those who are skilled enough to use it 
properly. The case is by no means one of mute signs that catch or address us. It is we who 
make the language sounded in sending and receiving signs as markers. Of course, we do 
not act as isolated Robinsons. We are equipped with general societal (and added 
professional) education, socialisation and practice of common understanding. This is 
strengthened by daily use, suitable to re-conventionalise language practice. Thereby, we 
actualise the language that may make both our procedures and life in society liveable and 
reasonable.
20. Language is certainly not exact, on the one hand. This continues to be so 
notwithstanding the fact that, as the most available mediator in societal contact and 
commerce, only such an ambivalent medium can fulﬁ l language’s ontological role, on the 
6 See, e.g. the discussion on the ontology of nature between Eugen Dühring and Friedrich 
Engels.
7 What has already been (reminding this above form of “The nothing noths”) raised as a problem 
in English–American analytics (by Rudolf Carnap, John Austin, etc.) as well.
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other hand. Moreover, not even in principle could language be reduced into a less 
unambiguous mediator or conveyor of meanings. At the most, we may try to be more 
precise in our handling and resolution (dedicated to given relationships or limiting issues, 
when we draw limits or weigh individual situations), by asserting in a socially valid way 
what we want to express then and there. When we proceed by deﬁ ning an actualised 
meaning (instead of the physical act or linguistic symbolism pointing directly at what we 
actually mean), a step forward is taken indeed, but without ameliorating the language itself, 
its state of being fuzzy from the beginning. Our innovation or rectiﬁ cation generated at one 
moment will inevitably become like mist when problematising at another moment and this 
goes on inﬁ nitely. For the next moment we have language as it has ever been: silent–and 
defective in counselling. This is to say that the next moment is faced with a new situation, 
with novel expectations toward language, or mediation through language.
21. That which may catch and bind us in fact is neither language nor law expressed 
lingually, but our conventionality. In societal cooperation we do rely on law, among other 
things. We call upon it, refer to and interpret it, trying to settle affairs according to patterns 
it has forwarded. For law offers orientation in settling disputable practical issues. It offers 
guidance and proposes a normative model. It serves us by being wedged amongst us, 
separating the partners in dispute, by being independent of each of us and disposing of 
relative consistency. For it is suitable for mediation by offering a pattern to our action. 
That is, it can model dispute resolution so that the outcome will be not of mine or yours 
but that foreseen with respect to all such (essentially or substantially similar) situations, 
cognoscible by anyone in advance. So, what will be concluded will have already been 
patterned.
22. It is facts that surround us in nature and social life. These are mostly facts simple 
and unmediated, “brute” and formless. What we are faced with in the law’s Tatbestand are 
already institutional facts. For law is not to be found in our affairs themselves. We identify 
it mostly outside of and above, and subsequent to, the elementary formative components of 
our affairs, at a time when we, reinterpreting them in the law’s normative context, try to 
project the law’s structured messages onto a factual or hypothetic case. Life is going on 
incessantly, following heterogeneous tracks. And the law is–allegorically speaking–
withdrawn like a spider, expecting now and then to strike at any of its selected aspects. 
Once that happens, the law  will assimilate this whole life event (by denaturing the latter’s 
heterogeneous full complexity) to the former’s homogenised–simpliﬁ ed–norming [Nor-
mierung]. Literally expressed, no one can any longer identify what the law has made out of 
it, and perhaps not those who are targeted by it; since one given Tatbestand (predeﬁ ned by 
the law) will have been distilled from its primitively unique full-of-life richness. And this is 
so because the Tatbestand cannot be anything other than the factual reﬂ ection of the 
corresponding normative ruling. The only features that can be included as imputed to the 
humans in question (to their casual drama or luck, taken as a personal, non-recurrently 
individual event) are those who have already been speciﬁ ed as relevant in the abstract 
regulation.
23. All this is as if artiﬁ cially erected nightmarish shades were looking for opportunities, 
with projective nets, in the density of life, with the aim of picking suitable relevance-sets 
from it. That is, an external logic is projected upon acts in life, according to different 
available considerations–for instance, to impute to a ﬂ ighty irascibility (attributed, e.g. to 
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O. J. Simpson8) homicide, adultery, personal injury, perhaps breach of contract, or even 
failure to meet his obligations for maintenance, out of the caldron of the legal witches’ 
kitchen. This is to say that as long as we have not decided at all what of this or that qualiﬁ es 
as having occurred according to the law, we may only ponder in silence. However, as soon 
as that is decided, we start banging on every gate: this is that, and only that, moreover, 
a master case of that–as if that had been invented from the beginning and only to sanction 
our client’s case.
Our game could appear to be funny as well if it were not both serious and indispensable. 
This structured and more-or-less homogenised thought is applied in all ﬁ elds of socialisation 
and societal transmission, that is, within the bounds of our humanly created second nature. 
As a consequence, life itself will be arranged following such a logic, destitute of the values 
and intimacy of the heterogeneity of everyday life but equipped with the force of social 
ordering and engineering, and, therefore, desired as the sine qua non of civilised human 
existence. For the sake of generating law and order for ourselves, we raise ﬁ xed points that 
are extrapolated and alienated from ourselves as the standards addressing us.
24. I may happen to carry only a potato to you. However, I cannot know in advance 
whether and when my or your lawyer will call it delivery, agency or necessity, supply or 
disturbance of possession, perhaps theft, or something else. In any case, the internal 
(primitive) logic of my action (with its process-like development and gradualness) may well 
differ considerably from that which will be ascribed to me in law. This is so because the 
action in question may have followed its own path alongside its ad hoc “logic” (chaotic in 
itself as having been formed from one moment to the next), with open alternatives in every 
movement forward here and there. And all this notwithstanding, the juridically constructed 
Tatbestand will reconstruct a cumulative development out of this, as a one-way process that 
may have pursued one preset end with features that involve nothing more than those facts 
that may make a case in law. And what is more, the way I shall be judged will be seen as 
the outcome of cognition, as if I were tracked all the way through by the knowledge of a 
neutral outsider–instead of treating me as the subject to whom the normative consequence 
of a system of norms is meted out.
25. The declared result of normative imputation is ascriptive. It will conclude some 
normative consequences of my action by the force of someone’s volitive act and discretion. 
The legal status as to which my action is being qualiﬁ ed or classiﬁ ed will be deﬁ ned with 
the above intention of imposing those consequences, and not as issuing from mere cognition. 
The whole process is not cognition as a result of someone having (with a magniﬁ er) 
searched in the law or examined the collective memory of my action in order to identify 
exactly what (and how) may have met in the two (normative and factual) components. In 
fact, my judge has tested variations to couple them–according to additional considerations 
such as the prevailing interests and, maybe, intuitive sym/anti-pathy towards me. By the 
very fact of having qualiﬁ ed the event as the case of the given legal category, my case has 
already been decided. This legal category being an institutional fact itself, it is not cognition 
but exclusively a volitional classiﬁ cation that will classify my action as a case of the law. In 
law, nothing is described: we only classify actual life situations here and there. Instead of 
cognising, we decide–with as much rationally as we can, and based on evidence as much as 
we can. Therefore, instead of converting the action into anything of logical necessity (that 
8 Cf. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O._J._Simpson_murder_case>.
105LAW, UNDERSTANDING OF LAW, APPLICATION OF LAW
is, into subsumption or a logically obvious conclusion), we subordinate it to something else 
with the justices’ volitional act’s force.
26. Let us pay attention to the change in emphasis here, from the logical model 
establishing necessary connections amongst our things in an impersonal way, to the social 
ontological nature of what in fact is stricken out and produced by our social action of fore-
planning, since all the connected steps are of such a type here that could have not ensued 
without their actual performance. Our human involvement is, therefore, creative and strictly 
constitutive, irreplaceably effectuating something. In other words, it is arbitrary in the sense 
of logical necessity, even if not otherwise senseless, indefensible or irrational. This is to say 
that it is mostly practical problem-solving that we are engaged in, whilst the motivation for 
our verdict–its justiﬁ cation–will prove, from the texture of the law, to be the compelling 
demand, that is, the necessity (even in details) of such–and only such–a solution.
27. All this takes the form of a decision. For the given solution never could be 
completed in another way without artiﬁ cially cutting off all the further (and otherwise 
feasible) paths and ways of the endless series of doubts, including the temptation to consider 
crossroads with alternative solutions. Until we have manipulated (interpreted and arranged) 
the facts to an adequate depth, not even their legal classiﬁ cation is ﬁ nalised. Nevertheless, 
disputing what this was, actually how this happened and what grounds we have for 
qualifying this as the case of that, can only be cut as a Gordian knot. This is equal to saying 
that our certainty is by no means absolute; therefore, the certainty concerned will be termed 
as “judicial” (i.e. artiﬁ cial), “rational” (i.e. limited) and/or “procedural” (i.e. with exclusive 
validity for the judgment) at most.9
9 We should consider how much we are used to ignore, when approaching law-application in a 
purely juristic manner (breaking it down into a syllogistic form), its fallible and contingent nature 
only justiﬁ able through the long-term reliability of human praxis in the last resort (which reproduces 
itself incessantly) in general, and the underlying character of the qualiﬁ cation of facts–for the story 
itself is to be reconstructed from the witnesses’ narrations expressed in different object-languages, 
which has to be transformed (transcribed) into a fact in the law, that is, “qualiﬁ ed” as the case, or 
subordinated to be a case, of an abstract deﬁ nition–and of the gaining of judicial certainty–with 
compiling the story in the course of evidence anyhow: from bare fragments, probability conclusions 
at different levels that may result mostly from additional circumstances, all them serving as the 
sufﬁ cient base to declare categorically sometime that that happened in fact–in particular. For all these 
components with their most elementary constituents are creative with a constructive force, irreducible 
to formal certainty in a scientiﬁ c sense, and as such, unsuitable to total rational reconstruction; the 
fact notwithstanding that these are the most substantive moments–serving as the turning points 
[Eckdaten]–of each and every judgement in justice.
  Methodologically speaking, it could only be compared to theology in explanation of the 
transcendence of human life, which, since the age of Saint Thomas Aquinas, was explicated in masses 
of volumes of great systemic corpuses, expressed in incessant discussions (in lines of competing 
directions) for centuries. Behind the whole undertaking, however, it is the humanity’s fullness of 
being–their total existential and practical consideration and decision, their extraordinary complex 
(psychological and other) attitude–that stands, which, in their ﬁ nite life and personal options, express 
an act of volition that, beyond a certain limit, cannot be stressed further by the mere means of ratio. 
This is the moment of credo (speciﬁ ed as the realisation of credo quia absurdum). Such realisation 
will be socialised by us as a Ding für uns, as something given to us, that we have to develop in our 
earthly life by the intervention of faith, that is, by recognising our created nature with the whole chain 
of ensuing conclusions. Once this recognition is achieved as wedged in our socialisation, every 
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28. This is why adjudication is eventually ﬁ nalised with legal force. Whatever decision 
is reached, it cannot tempt any longer. It must be ﬁ nally accomplished, placed in the 
archives’ oblivion, as a past instance of accomplishment of the then-prevalent law and 
order.
29. Musing on the ordering role of law in society, we may ponder on how many 
thousands of thousandths of our daily transactions are selected in order to provoke law-
sensitive deliberation at all, how many thousandths of them are made controversial in order 
to await judicial deliberation. A great volume, the overwhelming majority, of both deviances 
and actions that are hardly defensible in law will remain free from legal reaction. What 
percentage of the other part will gain ﬁ nal force without any appeal against its ﬁ rst 
adjudication? Perhaps this will be a majority of the cases whose juridical solution would 
presumably never reach reconﬁ rmation in legal reconsideration, while convenience, 
triviality or other petty conditions may have been in play in promoting their ﬁ rst conclusion 
with legal force.10;11
III. The Complexity of the Lawyers’ World Concept
30. The uniﬁ cation in institutional operation of conceptual patterning, on the one hand, with 
linguistic formulations, on the other, presumes complex constructions, together with the 
formation of human skills (mentalities and procedures) matched to these.
1. The Complexity of Civil Law Mentality
31. Within the range of utmost possibilities, the continental legal game builds up law-
application processes as an analogy of the cognitive ones common to the sciences: ﬁ rm 
platforms (as indubitable stepping stones), logiﬁ ed steps (inspired by mathematics), strictly 
methodical interpretation (of rules) and veriﬁ cation (of facts), all concluded to a certainty. 
Behind such an analogy, the lawyers’ ideology assists. It suggests logical force as a necessity 
with no alternative. As the entire construct is humanly operated, only a role of the police 
ofﬁ cer who directs trafﬁ c at turnouts seems to have been assigned to the lawyer. And behind 
component of the reconstructions from such theologies (with their mission’s vocation) turns at once to 
be intelligible for us, raising the awareness of its conclusions as well. But when this is missing, in the 
given ﬁ eld–and in regards of the actor in question–the object itself (together with the complex net of 
relevancies) will be lost: it will cancel itself out of their well-developed potential.
10 Cf., by Varga, Cs.: Theory of the Judicial Process. The Establishment of Facts. Budapest, 
1995; and Varga, Cs.: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999.
11 The historical explanation by Shapiro, M.: Islam and Appeal. California Law Review, 68 
(1980) 2, 350–381. In: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative Legal Cultures. Aldershot–Hong Kong–
Singapore–Sydney: Dartmouth–New York, 1992, 299–330, is inspired by such recognition. According 
to it, the state power that controls the course of “law and order” implementation has to tolerate–up 
to a certain level, grade and depth, having in view the practical considerations of practical 
operationability–the variety of jurisprudence effected in the name of law (with the competition of 
divergences involved), as inseparable from the total function. However, as a practical test of the 
legally relevant qualities of jurisprudence (such as unity, security, justice, and expediency) it will 
subject a randomly selected part of jurisprudential issues to sample-taking, in order to ﬁ lter their 
quality. So, historically speaking, this is the origin and the mental root appeal.
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the scenes nothing but our well-educated professional socialisation stands, requiring that 
the sole right decision will be reached from all available alternatives, the one which can be 
identiﬁ ed within the polarity of either truth or falsity.
2. The Complexity of Common Law Mentality
32. From a European continental perspective, we are used to considering the Anglo-Saxon 
approach as freed from ideology, because it abounds in marks of unsophisticated naturalness 
without artiﬁ cial mediatedness. No consideration is usually given to the fact that even its 
myth-coloured basic deﬁ nition is formed ideologically from the outset. For, as is well 
known, that approach generates a judicial declaration of what the law is from the alleged 
positivity of the immemorial custom of the Realm. Moreover, it is expressedly alienating by 
tripping the entire justice-game into lawyerly technical subtleties and tricks, in opposition 
to the logical clarity and transparent foreseeability of the continental Professorenrecht.12 
And, last but not least (and unless it creates its own subject of analysis as the result of 
today’s analytics) its demands are strikingly a-theoretical, with no receptivity to conceptual 
issues.13
IV. With Humans in the Legal Machinery
33. In turn, “humans are hidden in the machinery” as the law cannot function without an 
active human component. This is obvious, since there are no “correct” answers in 
themselves, as no exemplar of them can be found.14 We may endeavour to reach a rational 
12 It is no chance that legal theories of alienation were mainly formulated in the domain of 
Common Law. Cf., e.g. Conklin, W. E.: The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse. The 
Juridical Production and the Disclosure of Suffering. Aldershot and Brookﬁ eld (USA), 1998. 
Moreover, the exclusive purpose of the modern mainstream trend of Critical Legal Studies–cf., e.g. 
Bauman, R. W.: Ideology and Community in the First Wave of Critical Legal Studies. Toronto, 2002–
is to unseal the relations of dominance (as its ﬁ ghters claim: the capitalistic, male-chauvinistic, or 
European regimes, or the ones ruled by the centres of the world economy or by the Christian faith, 
and so on) from the artiﬁ cial ideological (defensive) linguistic cover of the law (provided with codes 
of mere techni cality).
13 Almost the only exception I have taken cognisance about is Samuel, G.: Epistemology and 
Method in Law. Aldershot and Burlington (VA), 2003.
   It is an alarming instance to learn from a dispute–Ratio Juris, 20 (2007) 2, 302–334–launched 
by Italian and Polish scholars about a volume–Shiner, R. A.: Legal Institutions and the Sources of 
Law. Dordrecht, 2005–of a representative international series–Pattaro, E. (ed.): A Treatise of Legal 
Philosophy and General Jurisprudence 3–the doubts expressed on the sense of such a universalising 
bosh, which is destitute of the lowest theoretical sensitivity in the author’s exclusive dealings with 
American daily topics under the aegis of global legal theorising, stuffed with the want of genuine 
academic knowledge, as if the author never heard, for instance, of the doctrine on the sources of law, 
legal institutionalism, or Hans Kelsen’s foundational doctrine. Rounding this specimen of intellectual 
poverty by not even understanding the stake, in his rebutter the author calls its European critics to the 
respect of liberal tolerance and academic freedom, perhaps for lack of anything better.
14 In theoretical reconstruction, my concern is certainly not the validity of propositions that 
natural law doctrines (aiming at ontological foundations inspired by theological presuppositions) or 
practical philosophies (in their rebirth today) may advance in search for connections, but exclusively 
the speciﬁ c issue of the ways in which prevalent trends (or their comparable analogons) may exert 
fermentative effect on the daily administration of justice.
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justiﬁ cation at the most, and through benevolent discourses in human communities, an 
optimum solution has to be targeted somehow. We are fallible humans, as fallible as are our 
endeavours to make the world better. We may try to ﬁ nd salvation exclusively with skills 
and instruments we have developed, and, of course, through unceasingly adapting and 
correcting them.
34. Irrevocably and unavoidably, all that remains is to draw on the recognition that, 
notwithstanding our different societal roles, somehow we all are parts of the practice of 
reproducing this understanding with full personal responsibility–whether as citizens, or as 
educators and socialisers (who form the public understanding professionally as teachers, 
priests, journalists and other social workers), or as intellectuals or politicians (who shape 
the former’s frameworks), or having been speciﬁ cally initiated as actors in the law’s 
workings.
35. In the ﬁ nal analysis, our law as actually practiced will hardly be anything other 
than that which we have formed out of it through our social co-operation and the ﬁ ghts we 
have undertaken.15
36. In the end, law is a mode of speaking. It is practiced as a speciﬁ c ﬁ eld of 
communication with a game of open scenes, which is actualised if played by humans 
through actual referencing. Accordingly–and instead of “what it is?”–“all that notwith-
standing: how it can be achieved” will be the ﬁ nal question that serves as a criterion 
as well.
This also involves a call for axiology, in order to set some standard as a foundational 
stepping stone. This is to be done even if in the absence of a claim that we have made it 
suitable to conclude anything from it or subordinate anything to it (as the past antagonistic 
rivalry between the doctrines of natural law and legal positivism stressed). And this may 
presume to arrive ﬁ nally at a development from thesis via anti-thesis to syn-thesis related to 
the correlation among humanity’s natural, societal and spiritually founded intellectual 
world, perhaps strengthened as well by the re-/dis-solution of the law’s positivistic self-
deﬁ nition. Thereby, a genuine re-foundation may also be achieved in order to master 
humanity’s response to the global challenges that are at our door.
15 For an outlook, cf., by Varga, Cs.: Doctrine and Technique in Law. Iustum Aequum Salutare, 
IV (2008) 1, 23–37 {and <http://www.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ias/20081sz/02.pdf> and www.univie.ac.at/RI/
IRIS2004/Arbeitspapierln/ Publikationsfreigabe/Csaba_Phil/Csaba_Phil.doc}.
